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Many Realities, Many Words: Abortion and the
Struggle over Meaning
DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC: COMMUNICATING SOCIAL CHANGE.

By Celeste M. Condit.t Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois
Press, 1990. Pp. xv, 224. $24.95.T
CONTESTED LIvEs: THE ABORTION DEBATE IN AN AMERICAN COMMUNITY. By Faye D. Ginsburg.Jt Berkeley: University of Califor-

nia Press, 1989. Pp. xiv, 247. $25.00.1
ABORTION:

THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES.

By Laurence H. Tribe.ft

New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1990. Pp. xvi, 242. $19.95.1
Reviewed by Isabel Marcus*
In 1973, shortly after Roe v. Wade was decided, I recall waxing eloquent on the wisdom of that decision at a conference of feminist lawyers
and law students. "True, it did not give women absolute control over
their reproductive capacity-but it did provide all women with a significant amount of choice in their lives," I announced with all the hubris and
intensity of a middle-class young white woman in my demeanor and
voice. A middle-aged woman from Michigan listened patiently to me.
Then she said in quiet, somber tones: "I've been an activist in politics for
years in the heartland. You have no idea how powerful the backlash will
be against this decision." I recall musing for a moment about the import
of her comment. She, after all, was a battle-scarred veteran. Then I dismissed it with a respectful but skeptical silence.
Some seventeen years later, her unerringly accurate prediction has
surfaced from my memory. No longer advantaged or disadvantaged by
youth (depending on one's perspective), I find myself reflecting on that
incident. Now, its several levels of meaning are apparent to me.
t Associate Professor of Speech Communication, University of Georgia. B.S. 1977, Idaho
State University; M.A. 1980, Ph.D. 1982, University of Iowa.
1 Hereinafter cited by author's last name and page number only.
Assistant Professor of Anthropology, New York University. B.A. 1976, Barnard College
(Columbia University); Ph.D. 1986, City University of New York.
ift Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard University. A.B. 1962, J.D.
1966, Harvard University; LL.D. 1980, Gonzaga University.
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. B.A. 1961, Barnard College
(Columbia University); M.A., Ph.D. 1974, J.D. 1975, University of California at Berkeley.
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At both the personal and political levels it embodies the complex
impulses of the second wave of feminism of the Seventies. In those years,
I, like many other women (especially young white women), was testing
the responsiveness of every institution and practice, and the quality of
every norm, through the prism of feminism. Not surprisingly, the outcome was a resounding set of failing grades; society's sensibilities were
woefully deficient.
Fueled by consciousness-raising group experiences and an avalanche
of compelling literature, I readily endorsed the proposition that every
society oppressed its women qua women. I believed I understood the
historically boundless ability and capacity of patriarchal institutions to
repress, sidestep, ignore, minimize, or, at best, co-opt efforts to ameliorate the status of women in any society. Backed by the strength of a
"movement," I anticipated and envisioned transformative possibilities at
the personal and the political level, probably in a decade or two, but
surely in my lifetime.
In my fervor, I believed that no institution-not even the most patriarchal of institutions, the legal system-would be immune from such an
imperative of history. Roe was partial verification of that belief. It
capped a series of dramatic cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut 1 and Eisenstadtv. Baird2 in which the Supreme Court appeared to be
cognizant of the reality that, for large numbers of Americans, sex and
sexuality were separate from reproduction. Though this recognition was
not framed in a feminist voice, the very articulation of these ideas in an
arena so removed from the usual setting of Americans' private lives was
electrifying.
I disregarded my partial understanding that law is an inherently unreliable vehicle for effecting social change. 3 After all, weren't the legal
changes generated by the civil rights movement monumental? And
didn't those changes emerge from the work of a mass movement and, in
turn, reinforce that movement's momentum? Surely victory begat
victory.
In the racial context, law outlawed what hitherto was legal; in the
reproductive rights context, law made legal what hitherto was illegal. In
both contexts, the power of the state would no longer be marshalled to
coerce deferential, furtive, or life-risking behavior. Removal of these barriers was more than a first step. It was a measure of profound symbolic
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
3. Cf C. SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 21-25 (1989) (discussing the difficulties that feminism faces in challenging traditional legal establishments).
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importance in a country that prides itself on being "a government of laws
and not of men [sic ...but, then again, perhaps not]."
With the advantage of hindsight, I acknowledge that my vision of
social justice and change, if not societal transformation, was removed
from the troubling aspects of the gritty mainstream of political and social
reality in America. I underestimated the power of the fear of change and
the propelling force of traditional religious fervor and passion. Like
many other young women, I ignored the application of this inflammatory
mix to issues of family life and female sexuality.
There is more than a touch of irony in the fact that an issue which
surfaced from back alleys and underground women's networks into fullblown political discourse should now, within a quarter of a century, be a
political litmus test for elected officials at every level of government and
for appointees in both the executive and judicial branches. For those of
us with reproductive histories4 that predate the full-time protection of
the pill and the resort to accessible, safe, legal abortion when contraception failed or was not used, the pace of social change seems to have accelerated. But that acceleration is not cost-free. The battle over our wombs
5
has and will have its price.
Informing these words is my own, not unusual reproductive history,
which, though person-specific, connects me with other women--especially those women who are in my generational and social cohort. Like
me they are white, middle-class, and, now, middle-aged. Many of them
may have experienced reproductive events similar to mine: the delivery
and survival of two children, one miscarriage, and even an illegal
abortion.
In making such a disclosure and providing this extended personal
statement, I am fully aware that I may appear to be appropriating protective authority for my position and critique by relying on a crude form
of "identity politics."' 6 My choice of method, however, was not guided
4. All women are parties to their own specific reproductive histories which, in turn, are connected to larger social histories. Specific histories include not only pregnancies but also the avoidance of pregnancy through contraception or abortion. In contrast, men do not identify with their
own specific reproductive history, though if a wider range of contraceptives for males would be
developed presumably they too would have such a history.
5. Biological reductionism lurks in the culture, and its surfacing reminds one of the multiple
connections between women's sexuality, reproduction, and subordination. I attempt to describe this
phenomenon in a work in progress entitled Womb Wars.
6. This currently popular theoretical and political stance maintains that by virtue of certain
life experiences-in this instance, experiences connected with my fundamental social identity as a
woman with all the appropriate race, class, and age qualifiers-my statements regarding these experiences are more authentic and meaningful than those of others who are outsiders to these exper-

iences. See E.

SPIELMAN,

INESSENTIAL WOMAN:

PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST

THOUGHT 137-59 (1988) (criticizing this theory as making women and their individual traits "ines-
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by self-serving instrumentalism. Rather, I have mentioned the specific
history that I bring to a discussion of abortion-my "location"-because
the different "locations" of the authors is a significant concern and focus
in this review of three recent books on abortion: Celeste Condit's Decoding Abortion Rhetoric: CommunicatingSocial Change, Faye Ginsburg's
Contested Lives: The Abortion Debate in an American Community, and
Laurence Tribe's Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes. Just as my location
informs my reading of these books and is relevant to my undertaking as a
reviewer, each author's location is relevant to an analysis of his or her
ideas, and surely warrants identification, inclusion, and explication in
any critique.
All three authors are affiliated with the academy, but speak from the
vantage point and training of different disciplines. Tribe is a professor at
Harvard Law School. Ginsburg is an assistant professor of anthropology
and director of a film-making program at New York University. Condit
is an associate professor of speech communication at the University of
Georgia.
Tribe is a well-known litigator of constitutional issues as well as a
scholar and teacher of constitutional law. In fact, he has participated in
key abortion rights cases before the United States Supreme Court. 7 In
other words, Tribe is located deep within the adversarial fray, as a partisan of the pro-choice position. He has assisted in framing the contemporary legal discourse on abortion and has helped craft the categories upon
which it relies. Through his adversarial skills he has reinforced the
boundaries of what he now describes as the "clash of absolutes," though
one would hardly know this important, relevant aspect of his life from
the volume itself.
What prompts this lacuna? The format of traditional legal scholarship in which it is de rigueurthat authors not identify themselves with
the emotional significance of their work? Tribe's desire to recast his reputation? Plain and simple modesty?
Motives notwithstanding, Tribe's volume is written in a voice which
sential"); see also Grbich, The Body in Legal Theory, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW 61 (M.
Fineman & N. Thomadsen eds. 1991); Willisma, On Being the Objectof Property,in id. at 22. Social
attitudes sometimes fuel this perception as much as, or more than, the author's intent. See BELL
HOOKS, YEARNING: RACE, GENDER, AND CULTURAL POLITICS 176 (1990) (noting a "tacit assump-

tion that because [Spike Lee] is a black man his images are 'purer' and therefore not subject to the
same rigorous critique [as a] white filmmaker exploiting black subject matter").
7. Most recently, Professor Tribe argued before the Court in Rust v. Sullivan, Nos. 89-1391,
89-1392 (U.S. argued Oct. 30, 1990), on behalf of local and state agencies and a federally funded
family planning clinic seeking to invalidate federal regulations that "prohibit such clinics from providing abortion information or referrals to their clients." Arguments Before the Court, 59 U.S.L.W.
3337, 3337 (Nov. 6, 1990).
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removes him from the fray. Law school colleagues will recognize its
classic tenor instantly. First, two sides of an argument are developed.
The categories used to construct the two sides come to the argument
burdened with extensive social and political histories, as well as legal
ones. Each category is pushed to its "rational" or "logical" limit or,
more likely, beyond. Into the confusion generated by the verbal transformation from reasonable to unreasonable and from logical to illogical
steps the professor, whose function is to construct a way out of the seemingly hopeless situation.
Ginsburg, on the other hand, is a committed ethnographer. Her
book allows a close, penetrating exploration of the life and beliefs of
others, while acknowledging authorial self-involvement in this process of
inquiry. Observing and analyzing others involves their very construction
in the author's mind, and engaging in such construction without reproducing oneself is no easy task. In Contested Lives, Ginsburg collects,
analyzes, and conveys the life histories of female abortion activists in
Fargo, North Dakota, and documents the development of local organizations involved in that city's abortion controversy. Her goal is to delineate "how the larger cultural processes in contemporary American culture
that inform the abortion controversy take on shape and meaning for activists in terms of local knowledge and experience."" This move from
macro to micro is appealing and manageable. Readers may be able to
recognize in the text aspects of themselves and experiences comparable
to, or in contrast to, their own.
Ginsburg's work reflects the anthropologist's classic concern with
the role of the observer and his or her "location" in the field. The great
architects of anthropology-Malinowski, Boas, Benedict, Mead, and
Gluckman-on whose works large numbers of undergraduate and graduate students have feasted, observed and sought to understand other cultures. Unlike their nineteenth-century precursors, these anthropologists
were aware of the need not to exoticize or fetishize the "non-industrial"
societies of tribal people they studied. Whether they were successful in
so doing is another matter. What is important here is that they were
aware of a significant epistemological problem which had immediate
methodological implications for their work and discipline as observers
and students of another culture. Ginsburg's inquiry is informed by a
version of that impetus to consciousness of self in the process of understanding and interpreting others.
Not surprisingly, therefore, Tribe's silence regarding his "location"
8.

GINSBURG,

p. 6.
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finds no echo in Ginsburg's work. Ginsburg signals her concern with
authorial voice through a strategy which consists of informing the reader
that she is a genuine "outsider" to the community she is studying. Not
only is she not a native of Fargo, a middle-sized Midwestern community,
she is "a young, unmarried Jewish and urban visitor from New York
City" 9 studying residents of a community who are "married, Christian
and from rural or small town backgrounds."' 10 But, she reassures the
reader, despite her "outsider" status (and, paradoxically, in some situations, because of that status), she was able to communicate with the locals. This reassurance, it should be noted, is highly functional. It calms
the reader and preserves the professional prerogative and status of the
ethnographer. So employed, "location" becomes a vehicle both for establishing credibility and minimizing the potential heavy-handedness of
academic expertise.II
Finally, Condit, as a student of communication, is concerned with
that most timely of topics-speech. But, in Condit's hands, the reader
need not experience an almost Pavlovian shudder triggered by her use of
the academically pervasive D-words: "discourse" and "decoding." For
Condit does not seek to mystify her subject through neologisms and references to a daunting canon with the MLA imprimatur. Discourse for
her is rhetoric-the classic art of persuasion. Decoding is a form of complex and sophisticated analysis of the connections between public argument, with its change-producing and transformative aspects, and the
sources of power in a society, as well as the relationship between public
argument and the real-life experiences of an audience to whom the argument is addressed.
Condit too is concerned with awareness of the academic's vantage
point. Her approach appears to be the antithesis of Ginsburg's. Consistent with her discipline's canon and norms, Condit utilizes an immersion
strategy which consists of "full empathic engagement with all positions." 2 Though her strategy seems completely contrary to Ginsburg's,
Condit also does not want to lose her status as an "objective scholar."
"Immersion," she claims, produces a standard of objectivity in her disci-

9. GINSBURG, p. 5.
10. GINSBURG, p. 6.

11. Whereas Ginsburg identifies herself but suppresses her voice, at the other end of the ethnomethodological spectrum is sociologist Judith Stacey. In her new work, Brave New Families,Stories
of Domestic Upheaval in Late Twentieth Century America, Stacey not only identifies herself but
asserts her voice by utilizing a dual set of narratives: the voices of her subjects and her own selfreflexive voice. Presumably the disjuncture such a presentation creates for the reader is part of the
experience of postmodernism.
12.
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pline which is sounder than that of "disinterest." 13 And, incidentally,
her professional prerogative, as an authoritative and uncompromising an14
alyst, is preserved.
The academic backgrounds and disciplinary approaches of the three
authors is not the sole source of their "location." A related but distinguishable component is the extent to which Tribe, Ginsburg, and Condit
open themselves up through their approaches to having their views on
abortion substantially altered. The "self-risk" of allowing one's views to
be shaped by the experience of undertaking research enjoys an endearing
and honorable position in the academy, at least for thoughtful intellectuals, and identifying its presence or absence in the three books is a worthwhile comparison.
Condit describes her self-risk process as "surprisingly painful."1 5
She reports that the research experience and the involvement of self in
that process provided her with a fuller understanding of "the crucial role
of abortion in some women's lives and the substantiality of the later-term
fetus." 1 6 Given the author's concern with the maintenance of her scholarly credibility, this is a perfect outcome. Her fuller understanding is
evenly divided between the two sides to the conflict.
Even as an "outsider" there is self-risk for Ginsburg. She reveals
this quite clearly in her Epilogue entitled "Pro Dialogue."1 7 Ostensibly
this chapter is concerned with her discovery of a trend toward dialogue,
at least for a brief period in 1985-86, between opposing camps in Fargo.
This trend, she argues, points to a link between the seemingly irreconcilable antagonists: namely, a concern to "alleviate the unequal conditions
faced by women in American culture."1 8 Quite handily, this turn of
events and her interpretation of it further validate her argument that
abortion is a gendered struggle over competing notions of womanhood.
All too fleetingly, in this context, Ginsburg mentions her own motivations for her study and her experience of hostility from pro-choice professional colleagues 19 who either do not want to hear or do not want to give
credence to some of the voices that Ginsburg documents. Along with the
13. Id.
14. In a rather forthright statement, Condit addresses another aspect of a vantage point connected with power and hierarchy in the academy: "Unlike so many books these days, this work was
not supported by foundations or time off from teaching or other outside aid." CONDIT, p. ix. One
does not know what to make of this statement. Is it an anticipatory defense of any critical limitations ofher work? Does it settle a vendetta? Is it a complaint? Or should it be viewed as a not-sooblique reference to her academic heroism and fortitude?
15. CONDIT, p. xiii.
16. Id.
17. GINSBURG, pp. 222-26.
18. GINSBURG, p. 226.
19. GINSBURG, p. 223.
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self-risk process of having her views "changed and deepened" 20 (a point
on which she does not provide any further elaboration, though she must
surely recognize that it is of concern and interest to a reader) Ginsburg
experiences professional risks to her credibility generated by what she
21
characterizes as her nonpartisan stance.
Speaking of self-risk, it is interesting to note that there is no mention
of it in Tribe's volume-vulnerability may be the property of others, but
not of the author. This is noteworthy because, in some ways, Tribe has
undertaken the greatest amount of self-risk of the trio of authors. He is a
known partisan advocate of the pro-choice position. In helping craft the
strategies and deploy the categories, he has presumably been aware of the
cultural and moral implications of these heady choices, even if their full
course could not have been predicted. For all intents and purposes,
Tribe is a social engineer and therefore a professed self-risk taker. While
I am not arguing for a confessional mode, I believe some signals to his
22
readers are in order; hence my concern with their absence.
Despite their "location" differences, the authors do focus on overarching themes which share a measure of complementarity, if not commonality. All three recognize the contemporary conflict over abortion as
a struggle over meanings in a public argument as well as in private lives.
All three are aware that history and culture affect contemporary legal
outcomes and public policy. And all three are concerned about the apparent intractability of the partisan contestants.
Condit's work on the scope of and shift in public argument is the
most far reaching and, in some ways, the most thought provoking. She
begins with the development of public discourse regarding abortion
through early-1960s accounts of illegal abortions which, she argues, became the basis of the change-seeking narrative. 23 This narrative, in turn,
evoked opponents' restoration of what Condit identifies as a "specific
strand of white, Western, Christian history as the authoritative and legit20. GINSBURG, p. xi.

21. See GINSBURG, p. xi (explaining that her task in writing the book was not to take a partisan
position).
22. My remarks about self-risk could be interpreted as suggesting that there are gendered ways
of conducting research and reporting it. In turn, this position could be attributed to a belief in some
underlying essentialist difference between women and men manifested in research style and outcome.
I want to underscore that I am not espousing this position. On the other hand, I suspect it is not
purely fortuitous that the self is acknowledged in Condit and Ginsburg and denied in Tribe. Nor is
this acknowledgement solely the product of disciplinary differences. Nor is it explainable by the fact
that Condit and Ginsburg are junior and Tribe is a nationally known figure. Could it be the subject
matter and the cultural assumption that because abortion is a "women's issue" no woman can be
assumed to be "objective"? One is left wondering.
23. CONDIT, pp. 22-36.
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imate American heritage."' 24 The "heritage" tale of abortion opponents
relies on history to demonstrate moral improvement specifically through
more restrictive prohibitions against abortion. 25 While these competing
narratives contain, at least implicitly, references to broad public values,
Condit locates the fuller articulation of such values in the struggle over
life, as well as equality and freedom, that combined into a demand for
choice between 1965 and 1972. This demand ultimately appears to have
led to the development and integration of a new, legitimated vocabulary
regarding abortion into the culture. Mindful that public argument contains images as well as words, Condit (quite correctly I believe) maps the
power of the fetus in public consciousness, including the ability of the
26
image to incite violence.
Lawyers should be on notice that the author does not speak about or
analyze legal discourse until halfway through the book, 27 and even then
she moves on with some alacrity to media presentations of unwanted
pregnancies. 28 In so doing, Condit contextualizes legal discourse in a
useful manner. Law is not some deus (or, more accurately, dea) ex
machina, though as Condit recognizes, it is framed by specialists in a
specialized vocabulary and has available to it "a direct performative
power open to very few genres of public address. ' 29 While acknowledging that law "marshals the coercive power of the state behind certain
vocabularies instead of others,"'3 0 Condit argues that law is deeply connected to social meanings in the larger culture. Such a perspective is
often all too casually imparted to law students, and I for one am prepared to argue that they are worse off for not being encouraged to take
this idea more seriously and explore it.
In the abortion debate one encounters the paradox of the centrality
of the law and its marginality. The availability of safe legal abortion may
have had an impact on its incidence, but it would be incorrect to assume
that pregnancy termination was not widely practiced even during its
legal prohibition. Tribe is aware of this paradox, as his willingness to use
history and culture (which is discussed below) demonstrates. But his
24. CONDIT, p. 44.
25.

See J. CONNERY, ABORTION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC PERSPEC-

TIVE (1977); R. HUSER, THE CRIME OF ABORTION IN CANON LAW (1980); J. NOONAN, JR., CONTRACEPTION: A HISTORY OF ITS TREATMENT BY THE CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTS

(enlarged ed. 1986); Noonan, Jr., An Almost Absolute Value in History,in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (J. Noonan, Jr., ed. 1970).
26. CONDIT, p. 94.

27. CONDIT, pp. 96-122.
28. CONDIT, pp. 123-46.
29. CONDIT, p. 97.

30. Id.
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particular contribution comes from his understanding that, especially
when cloaked in the language of rights, legal discourse is a compelling
part of American culture and politics-and nothing is dearer or more
challenging to lawyer, judge, and legislator than the exquisite balancing
of competing rights eloquently argued.
Tribe wants the reader to experience the twists of legal reasoning, to
be stimulated by them, and, quite possibly, to argue with himself or herself, as well as with others. So, in his dutiful, scholarly fashion, Tribe
unpackages the constitutional arguments in the debate by addressing the
basic questions: who is protected, how much protection is afforded, and
who is the protector? Reminding the reader that Roe reflected a judicial
compromise, 3 1 Tribe marches through standard constitutional arguments
in an orderly fashion. Basically, he finds abortion rights in the United
States Constitution through an analysis of a liberty interest in privacy.
Balanced against this liberty interest are the claims emanating from fetal
personhood. 32 Here he finds a "clash of absolutes." Lost in the shuffle
are some of the intellectually more tantalizing issues of the debate such
as equality claims 33 and a rethinking of the possibilities of the Ninth
34
Amendment.
To his credit, in reviewing the anti-choice proposals such as requiring parental or spousal consent or notification, waiting periods, limiting
the reasons for the performance of abortion, and restricting funding for
abortions or health care facilities performing abortions, Tribe makes it
clear that these policies are not real compromises. 35 Instead, he seems
more enthused by "humane" options such as increased postnatal care,
better sex education and birth control techniques, RU-486, and such new
technologies as artificial wombs. 36 Many of these ideas are part of the
liberal agenda. Although desirable as part of a civilized society, they are
collateral rather than central to the clash. Only the artificial womb has
direct implications for the controversy and, clearly, requires far more
attention than Tribe is able to give it.
For Ginsburg, legal discourse may lurk, but it surely does not loom,
in the struggle over meaning embodied in Fargo's conflict over a clinic
providing abortion services. Rather, the prism through which the abortion conflict is refracted in ContestedLives is the author's experience and
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
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interpretation of being a woman. 37 Personal meaning infuses the goals of
both the pro- and anti-choice activists through this channel. Framing
such activism are their respective narratives, which Ginsburg designates
as "procreation stories"-ongoing reconstructions of experience which
connect past and present as well as action and belief.38 In a sense, Ginsburg's study brings the analysis of public discourse full circle: we are
back to Condit's mapping of competing discourses in mainstream
culture.
A second common theme in the three volumes is the many connections among culture, history, law, and public policy. For an interdisciplinary reader this makes each work a far more satisfying read. Almost one
quarter of Tribe's book is devoted to a cross-cultural analysis of abortion,
39
including a summary of two centuries of abortion in the United States.
Presumably, these chapters provide useful background for the contemporary American policy debate, but Tribe's compilation follows the most
elementary and marginally useful of comparative law and comparative
government study formats, in which "facts" are piled up as if sheer mass
and volume should give us insight and understanding. Confronting the
wealth of data proffered by Tribe, the reader quite correctly should be
asking "What does it all mean?" The most obvious answer is that a
range of reproductive practices and choices have existed and continue to
exist regardless of political structure, legal system, or prevailing religious
beliefs. In fact, the practices coexist with institutions that ignore, deny,
or punish them. 4°
Imparting the message that abortion is a universal practice and has
a long history in the United States is a starting point for how it should be
approached as we enter the twenty-first century. But given the time and
energy expended by Tribe to this segment of the book, much more could
be developed through analysis of the material presented. In fact, the one
whisper of analysis occurs when Tribe asks whether we should import
37. Here Ginsburg's work supplements the pioneering work of sociologist Kristin Luker. See
K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984). Chapters 7 and 8 of Luker's
book are especially relevant in this connection.
38. GINSBURG, p. 134.
39. TRIBE, pp. 27-51.
40. This point was illustrated most dramatically for me during a trip in June 1985 to Nicaragua. I heard numerous stories from women, including health professionals, about the large numbers
of self-induced abortions and the health risks to the women who had acted out of such desperation.
Toward the end of the visit I had the opportunity to encounter a Catholic priest identified with
liberation theology and close to the government who talked with great eloquence and compassion
about issues ofsocial justice and redistribution. Along with several other women I asked him about
the incidence of abortion in Nicaragua. A look ofhorror crossed his face. "It is against the law," he
said. And, he added, "no woman has ever made a confession of such an act to me."
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Europe's compromises to the United States. 41 In answering that question, he spends the next three pages tearing apart the arguments of his
Harvard Law School colleague Professor Mary Ann Glendon, whose
comparative analysis work4 2 is equally primitive and unsatisfying. In
this instance of Godzilla meets Godzilla, the outcome is-not surprisingly-a draw.
Ginsburg situates the current debate over the legalization of abortion and its consequences within the extended history and tradition of
female reform movements. This is a good starting point. But, ironically,
in choosing a relatively homogeneous community apparently not riven
by class or racial cleavage and conflict as her research site, Ginsburg has
reproduced one of the most fundamental limitations of many of the female reform movements: little or no sensitivity to conditions of race and
class and their impact on the framing of issues and on prescriptions for
action and change. All too often controversy in such a limited context
appears benign, and the gender paradigms are less complex. Admittedly,
there is no "politically correct" community to study; but there are important aspects of the culture that her case study simply cannot address.
True, Ginsburg does turn her attention briefly to the issue of violence in the anti-choice movement, 43 but she dismisses it rather casually
as a part of American culture that tends to surface when the promise of
gains through mainstream tactics appears unfulfilled. 44 This is not a substitute for analysis. Other similarly situated groups do not necessarily
resort to violence. While such lack of fulfillment may be a necessary
condition, it certainly is not the sufficient explanation.
What Ginsburg does well is explore subjective experience and its
impact on women's definition of their interests. In so doing, she provides
data for Mary O'Brien's broad theoretical category of "reproductive consciousness" 45 and expands upon its meaning. 46 Moreover, Ginsburg concretizes O'Brien's construct by connecting the implicit categories of the
late twentieth-century debate to their nineteenth-century historical
antecedents. 47
41. See TRIBE, p. 73.
42. M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987); see TRIBE, pp. 73-76.
43. See GINSBURG, pp. 49-54. For discussions ofviolence and harassment at clinics, see Baker,
Pro-ChoiceActivism Springs from Many Sources, in FROM ABORTION TO REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM: TRANSFORMING A MOVEMENT 179 (M. Fried ed. 1990); Dixon, OperationOppress You: Wo-

men's Rights UnderSiege, in id. at 185; Peters, Every Sperm Is Sacred, in id. at 187.
44. See GINSBURG, p. 54.
45. M. O'BRIEN, THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 27 (1981).
46. "Women for and against abortion divide most clearly in their view of the causes for and
solutions to the unequal effects of sexual activity for women and men in America." GINSBURG, pp.
6-7.
47. While anti-choice women articulate the essentialist position that pregnancy and mother-
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Many Realities, Many Words
In contrast to Ginsburg, who explores the relationship between culture and discourse at the micro level, Condit operates at the macro level.
She, too, approaches social change processes through an analysis of ideology. More particularly, she is concerned with the longitudinal development of new myths, ideographs, and character types reaching the mass
audience beginning with the post-World War II shift toward legalization
of abortion. As she convincingly demonstrates, between 1965 and 1985
the manner in which Americans spoke in public space about abortion
changed markedly. In her most interesting and thought-provoking chapter, "Public Rhetoric and Private Lives, ' '4 8 she analyzes the relationship
between changes in public talk and private lives. This chapter is a useful
analytic complement to Ginsburg's section on "Procreation Stories." 49
There is a final common theme in the trio of works: the conclusions
each author reaches. All acknowledge the depth of the conflict. All
stress the fact that each side in the conflict claims to represent the true
interest of the community, though clearly the composition of the community differs significantly. (Most obviously, for anti-choice advocates
the community includes "the unborn" as persons, whereas for pro-choice
advocates the community is identified with individuals who have been
gestated and delivered.) All stress the fact that each side appears to believe in the inevitability of conflict. And all seem to be saying that they
have personally transcended that conflict, and possibly the feeling of its
endlessness, through the process of suspending beliefs and listening to all
positions.
At bottom, listening is assumed to be a form of rational activity that
allows for the crafting of different and better (because you have listened)
responses. This is every parent's watchword to their child and every
child's hope of its parents. Condit, Ginsburg, and Tribe evidently feel
that it is what is most lacking in the national debate over abortion.
Where the full coercive power of the state can be brought to bear to
heighten the health care hazards and burdens of an unwanted pregnancy
by outlawing abortion, thereby invalidating women as individuals who
have the capacity to make thoughtful moral choices, I am hard pressed
to be satisfied with such a prescription.
hood make men and women fundamentally different in society and in biology, pro-choice activists
focus on gender discrimination and structural change to address the different effects of pregnancy on
women and men. See GINSBURG, p. 7.
48. CONDrr, pp. 172-98.
49. GINSBURG, pp. 133-97.
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